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FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION AND 
PUBLIC SCHOOL TEACHERS 
ALLISON REYESt 
The freedom of expression which public school teachers exercise both inside 
and outside the classroom is confined within certain boundaries. This article 
explores issues, interests, and concerns which are relevant in defining these 
boundaries as reflected in the activities and comments of School Boards, the 
Community, parents, students, and teachers. The socialization of children is 
an important function of the education system, and is a function which is 
achieved through various "messages" communicated through curriculums. To 
maintain the effectiveness of "messages" inherent in the curriculum, the 
expression of public school teachers must be subject to some control. 
Ultimately, however, what also needs to be addressed is the legitimacy of 
current messages in relation to the goals of education and the composition of 
Canadian society. 
La liberte d'expression qu 'exercent les enseignantes et les enseignants des 
ecoles publiques a l'interieur et a l'exterieur de la salle de classe se confine 
dans certaines limites. Cet article examine des questions et des interets ayant 
rapport a la definition de ces limites en considerant les activites et !es com -
mentaires des commissions scolaires, de la communauti!, des parents, des etudi-
ants et des r!tudiantes, et des enseignants et des enseignantes. La socialisation des 
enfants est une fonction importante du systeme d'enseignement. Plusieurs 
«messages» communiques par des programmes scolaires remplissent cette fonc-
tion. Pour assurer que les «messages» dans les programmes scolaires soient bien 
communiques, ii faut surveiller !'expression des enseignantes et des enseignants 
dans les ecoles publiques. Cependant, en fin de compte, il faut adresser aussi la 
legitimite des messages actuels par rapport aux buts du systeme d'enseigne -
ment et par rapport a la composition de la societe canadienne. 
t B.A. (Saint Mary's), M.A. (Waterloo), LLB. anticipated 1995 (Dalhousie). 
35 
36 DALHOUSIE JOURNAL OF LEGAL STUDIES 
Not only are teachers expected to carry on their daily 
tasks within parameters determined by their employer 
but also they are expected to provide role models, per-
sonification of exemplary conduct, both in their profes-
sional and private lives, to the children they teach. Case 
law, statute law, board policy, and professional codes of 
ethics all reflect evidence of complex contractual obliga-
tions owed by the teacher to his employer, to the state, to 
parents, and to children. 1 
Any conception of freedom of expression in connection with public 
school teachers must recognize the complexity of teachers' relation-
ship, not only with students, but also with parents, the community, 
and the school. Due to the influence teachers have over students, an 
influence which does not stop at the "schoolyard gates," the con-
cept of freedom of expression assumes significant implications with 
regard to the teaching profession. 
The interest parents and various groups have in education indi-
cates that education is much more than simply repeating what is in 
a text; it is about communicating a whole range of values and as-
sumptions regarded as inimical to our existence as Canadians. 
Education, in many ways, is a form of socialization in which values 
and ideologies essential to the survival of the status quo are upheld. 
Freedom of expression is undoubtedly situated within a frame-
work robust with very noble goals. In theory, freedom of expression 
would seem conducive to an educational atmosphere. In practice, 
however, the education system imposes restrictions on expression 
which are necessary to maintain its integrity as an institution to 
which parents entrust their children. 
The curriculum is a powerful vehicle through which ideas are 
communicated. Within the classroom, teachers are expected to ad-
here to the prescribed curriculum. Balanced with this concept, is the 
idea of academic freedom. 2 A co-operative relationship between 
academic freedom and the curriculum is essential to attain the edu-
cational goals of truth and knowledge. An approach which under-
1 E. L. Herbert & M. A. Dynna, "Freedom of Expression Outside the 
Classroom" in W. F. Foster, Education and Law: A Plea far Partnership (Welland: 
Editions Soleil, 1992) at 59. 
2 "Academic freedom" refers to freedom of expression within the classroom. The 
terms are used interchangeably throughout the paper. 
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mines either will result in the perversion and frustration of these 
goals. Problematic to schools and teachers is achieving a correct bal-
ance which accommodates both of their interests. 
The integrity of the education system also depends to a great 
extent upon the perceived integrity of teachers. It is to this extent 
that expression outside the classroom becomes relevant. While the 
activities of teachers outside the classroom do not seem to impact 
directly on their ability to teach, they may conflict with the values 
which the education system perpetuates. 
This paper proposes to analyze the extent of teachers' freedom 
of expression within and outside the classroom. The parameters of 
this freedom will be considered in relation to the values and beliefs 
of "Canadians" as reflected in the education system. Additionally, 
the concepts of "medium" and "message" will be explored as a 
metaphor for teachers and the information/knowledge they impart 
to students. In a very real way, the perpetuation of values in society 
through the education system depends on the control school boards 
wield over both the medium and message. 
THE CONCEPT OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 
While the scope of this paper does not extend to an analysis of 
freedom of expression as guaranteed under section 2(b) of the 
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms,3 various statutes and case 
law which examine and expand upon the essence of the concept 
provide a useful and critical starting point for the discussion in this 
paper. 
The preamble of the Canadian Bill of Rights 4 outlines the prin-
ciples and beliefs upon which Canadian society is founded: 
The Parliament of Canada, affirming that the Canadian 
Nation is founded upon principles that acknowledge the 
supremacy of God, the dignity and worth of the human 
person and the position of the family in a society of free 
men and free institutions; 
3 Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 
(U.K.), 1982, c. 11 [hereinafter Charter]. 
4 RS.C., 1960, c. 44, as am. S.C. 1970-71-72, c. 38, s. 29; S.C. 1985, c. 26, s. 105; 
s.c. 1992, c. 1, s. 144. 
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Affirming also that men and institutions remain free 
only when freedom is founded upon respect for moral 
and spiritual values and the rule of law; 
And being desirous of enshrining these principles and 
the human rights and fundamental freedoms derived 
from them .... 
It is within this context that the Canadian Bill of Rights situates 
freedom of expression. Freedom of expression, as guaranteed in 
section 2(b) of the Charter, has been interpreted as drawing upon 
these principles. For example, in Irwin Toy the Court indicated that 
freedom of expression is intricately connected with: (1) a belief that 
seeking and attaining truth is an inherently good activity; 
(2) participation in social and political decision making is to be fos-
tered and encouraged; and (3) diversity in forms of individual self-
fulfilment and human flourishing ought to be cultivated in a toler-
ant and welcoming environment for the sake of both those who 
convey meaning and those to whom meaning is conveyed.5 
Freedom of expression is restricted only by "such reasonable 
limits prescribed by law as can be demonstrably justified in a free 
and democratic society" (Charter, section 1). The characteristics of 
a free and democratic society are numerous. In R v. Oakes 6 some of 
these more notable characteristics are described as including: 
respect for the inherent dignity of the human person, 
commitment to social justice and equality, accommoda-
tion of a wide variety of beliefs, respect for cultural and 
group identity, and faith in social and political institu-
tions which enhance the participation of individuals and 
groups in society.7 
Ultimately, in theory, freedom of expression is located within an 
intricate web of ideals and values which are inextricably connected 
with concepts of democracy, justice, equality and diversity. 
WHAT CONSTITUTES EXPRESSION? 
Irwin Toy established that expression has both a content and a 
form. Content essentially is the meaning which is conveyed, and 
5 Irwin Toy Ltd. v. Quebec (A.G.), [1989] 1 S.C.R 927 at 976. 
G [1986] 1 S.C.R. 103. 
7 In.franote46at136. 
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form is the way in which that meaning is conveyed. For example, 
activity is regarded as being expressive whether or not it intends to 
convey meaning. This is a rather all-encompassing idea of 
expression which begs the question of what is excluded from being 
expressive. The only exclusion Canadian courts have seemed to 
recognize is expression communicated in a violent form. 
RESTRICTIONS ON FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 
In R v. Keegstra, 8 McLachlin J. indicates some of the pressing con-
cerns which prompt society to limit expression: 
[F] reedom of expression must in certain circumstances 
give way to countervailing considerations. The question is 
always one of balance. Freedom of expression protects 
certain values which we consider fundamental-democ-
racy, a vital, vibrant and creative culture, the dignity of 
the individual. At the same time, free expression may put 
other values at risk. It may harm reputations, incite acts 
of violence. It may be abused to undermine our funda-
mental governmental institutions and undercut racial and 
social harmony. The law may legitimately trench on 
freedom of expression where the value of free expression 
is outweighed by the risks engendered by allowing free-
dom of expression.9 
Thus the freedom to express oneself is recognized as being limited 
by risks society will not reasonably tolerate. Activity which under-
mines the spirit and intent in which freedom of expression is en-
trenched will not benefit from its protection. Ultimately, freedom 
of expression should be understood as existing to further the values 
from which it was derived. 
TEACHERS AND FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION IN 
THE CLASSROOM 
The principles inherent within the concept of freedom of expression 
also inform the shape and character of the education system and its 
8 [1990] 3 S.C.R. 697. 
9 Ibid at 807. 
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goals. For example subsection 54(e) of the Education Act 10 states 
that among the duties of a teacher is to: 
encourage in the pupils by precept and example a respect 
for religion and the principles of Christian morality, for 
truth, justice, love of country, humanity, industry, tem-
perance and all other virtues. 
This general duty is constrained by other sections of the Act. For 
example, while subsection 5 (m) of the Act empowers the minister 
to "prescribe courses of study and authorize textbooks and related 
material for use in the school," subsection 54(a) of the Act states 
that a teacher must "teach diligently the subjects and courses of 
study prescribed" by or under the Act or regulations which are 
assigned by the school board. The controlled regulation of subjects 
and materials for study indicate that education is more than just 
teaching the three Rs (i.e. reading, writing, arithmetic); it is about 
transmitting values which are integral to the survival of society as it 
exists. 
Gordon suggests that the function of education is twofold. 11 
While the system is designed to mold students into "good" and 
"productive" democratic citizens, 
parents, legislatures, and the courts have often viewed the 
system of public education as serving a second, 
"inculcative" function: to serve as media for transmitting 
the values, beliefs, and ideology of their community to 
the next generation.12 
These functions may not be twofold as Gordon contends but rather 
part and parcel of each other. For example, being a "productive" 
member of society often requires that certain values, beliefs, and 
ideologies become internalized within an individual. Successful in-
ternalization is imperative for the continued existence of society in 
its present form. Thus various groups within society have a vested 
interest in ensuring that there is some continuity and homogeneity 
in the values and knowledge which our schools transmit. 
The curriculum is designed to meet the objectives central to the 
perpetuation of present society. Certain dichotomies are manufac-
IO R.S.N.S. 1989, c. 136. 
II R. M. Gordon, "Freedom of Expression and Values Inculcation in the Public 
School Curriculum" (1984) 13 J.L. & Edu. 523. 
12 Supra note 9 at 524. 
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tured into the curriculum, for example communism versus democ-
racy, developed countries versus third world countries; savages ver-
sus civilized persons. All of these dichotomies center around soci-
ety's conception of good (desirable) versus bad (undesirable). By 
looking at the duties assigned to a teacher in subsection 54( e), 13 
various assumptions are apparent. For example, what are the 
antitheses of Christian morality, patriotism, or industry? What do 
abstract concepts of "truth" and "justice" really entail? They are 
concepts which derive meaning not in a void, but in a context of 
assumptions; in this case, in the context of Canadian society which 
believes in certain fundamental values like "freedom," and 
"d " emocracy. 
To be effective, education and knowledge must be contextual-
ized. In schools, a great deal of this contextualization occurs at a 
subliminal level. This occurs when 
a. schools play the national anthem and say the lord's prayer 
every mornmg; 
b. we teach "standard" English grammar or literature; 
c. we teach a version of history which begins when Europeans 
came to Canada; 
d. we present geographically incorrect maps which 
"misrepresent" actual land sizes; and 
e. we teach values and beliefs central to a commercial and a 
free market society which values property. 
All of these things, it can be argued, constitute a continuous context 
for learning in which certain things are valued and other things de-
valued. It is within this context that students are taught to interpret 
the world around them. In this context, a version of truth gains the 
necessary universal agreement to attain the status of "fact." As 
noted by Perelman, a fact can lose its status when people begin to 
question its validity so that it descends from the starting point of 
argumentation to the conclusion of argumentation. 14 Society guards 
against this slippage by ensuring that "facts" which are connected to 
"truths" do not lose their status. The curriculum (which must be 
13 Supra note 10. 
14 C. Perelman & L. Olbrechts-Tyteca, The New Rhetoric (London: University 
of Notre Dame Press, 1969) at 67-70. 
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understood to include the context in which "truths" are 
communicated) thus becomes a powerful tool. 
Teachers are a significant part of the unofficial curriculum be-
cause of their status as "medium." In a very significant way the 
transmission of prescribed "messages" (values, beliefs, knowledge) 
depends on the fitness of the "medium" (the teacher). 
The right of school boards to impose some restrictions on the 
expression of teachers at first seems antithetical to the learning pro-
cess-education, after all, is about knowledge and truth, and the 
free exchange of ideas which would objectively further these goals. 
In theory, the free exchange of ideas would seem to be central to 
the concept of learning. In practice, however, while freedom of ex-
pression is certainly encouraged within an educational environment, 
there must be limits to this freedom if the prescribed "message" is 
to be successfully imparted to students. 
It is possible to conceive of how freedom of expression unfet-
tered can undermine some of the goals and objectives of the edu-
cation system. Thus freedom of expression is limited to defined pa-
rameters. Teachers are not permitted to transmit their own versions 
of truth, but rather are limited to presenting versions sanctioned by 
school boards and ministers of education. There are several good 
reasons for imposing some restrictions upon the freedom of expres-
sion of teachers, including: 
a. the need for consistency in what is taught; 
b. the utility of education as a means of socialization; 
c. the need to ensure that educational objectives are not un-
dermined by "marginal" ideologies. 
However, School Boards need to demonstrate that the limitations 
placed on teachers' freedom of expression are reasonable if they are 
to be upheld. The benefits of restricting teachers' expression are 
readily noticeable in a case like Keegstra v. Board of Education of 
Lacombe No. 14.15 
15 (1983), 25 Alta. LR. (2d) 370 (Bd. Re£). 
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FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION WITHIN THE 
CLASSROOM: THE KEEGSTRA CASE 
Mr. Keegstra was a teacher of grades nine and twelve social studies 
in Alberta. His classes focused on the presentation of a 
marginalized version of history known as the "international Jewish 
conspiracy" theory. This theory was taught in lieu of the sanctioned 
curriculum advanced by the Education Department, which Mr. 
Keegstra dismissed as presenting a censored version of history. 
Essentially, Keegstra taught his student that Jews had instigated 
every historical atrocity (revolutions, depressions, wars, etc.) in 
their attempt to achieve world power. Keegstra also attributed 
various evil characteristics to Jews during his teachings, often 
characterizing them as treacherous, subversive, sadistic, money-
loving, power-hungry, child killers, deceptive, secretive, and 
inherently evil. The majoriry of his class time was focused on these 
themes and students were expected to reproduce these teachings in 
tests, exams, and essays. While the School Board clearly did not 
subscribe to Mr. Keegstra's beliefs, their communications/ 
directives indicate that their purpose was not to limit or undermine 
Mr. Keegstra' s academic freedom or intellectual integrity. 16 
Rather, the School Board directed that if this theory was to be 
mentioned in class, it was not to be given the status of fact. 
Finally, after numerous warnings, the Board decided to dismiss 
Mr. Keegstra. The Board's reasons for dismissal (which were reaf-
firmed by a board of reference) were as follows: 
(1) Your failure to comply with Alberta Education's pre-
scribed curriculum and, in particular, the social studies 
curriculum. 
(2) Your failure to modify sufficiently your teaching 
content and/or approach to reflect the desires of members of 
the local community and the Board of Education, as com-
municated to you by the Superintendent of Schools 
(emphasis added).17 
On appeal, the School Board was found to have acted reason-
ably in terminating a teacher who had persistently and willfully re-
fused to follow the curriculum prescribed by the Minister of 
16 Ibid. at 375. 
17 Ibid. at 378. 
44 DALHOUSIE JOURNAL OF LEGAL STUDIES 
Education pursuant to the School Act, and/or comply with a lawful 
and reasonable directive of the Board. 
Although not many people would agree or support the teach-
ings of Mr. Keegstra, the case does raise some interesting questions 
about freedom of expression within the classroom. The excerpts 
from the correspondence directed to Mr. Keegstra indicate that 
academic freedom is to be limited by (1) the curriculum, (2) expec-
tations of the community, and (3) expectations of the Board as il-
lustrated in the selected curriculum. 
The power of indoctrination which teachers have over their stu-
dents is clearly apparent in this case. All of the students interviewed 
believed the international Jewish conspiracy theory to be historical 
fact. Mr. Keegstra's version was attaining a factual status by the 
students adherence and belief in its legitimacy. Mr. Keegstra as the 
primary "medium" was able to convey his "message" of an interna-
tional Jewish conspiracy to his students. The "message" gained un-
questioned legitimacy through its association with Mr. Keegstra. 
The Board was not only concerned about the diversion from the 
official curriculum but also about the inherently discriminatory as-
pect of the theory. Significantly, subsection 54(e) of the Education 
Act 18 includes among the duties of a teacher to encourage a love for 
humanity, truth and justice. The limitations placed on Keegstra are 
reasonable given these objectives. In R. v. Keegstra, 19 the Supreme 
Court of Canada considered whether Mr. Keegstra' s guarantee of 
freedom of expression allowed him to express his theory. It is 
significant that the court held freedom of expression may be 
legitimately limited if the particular expression undermines the 
values upon which Canadian society is founded. It follows then that 
the freedoms guaranteed in subsection 2(b) must be read in 
conjunction with section 27 of the Charter which states: 
This Charter shall be interpreted in a manner consistent 
with the preservation and enhancement of the multicul -
rural heritage of Canada. 
Any freedom of expression afforded within an educational context 
should be mediated by these same considerations. While multicul-
turalism within the education system may still be more theory than 
practice, it would be difficult for a Board to sanction an approach 
1s R.S.N.S. 1989, c. 136. 
l9 Supra note 8. 
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which was overtly discriminatory and contrary to the concept of 
multiculturalism, dignity, and tolerance upon which Canadian soci-
ety is theoretically founded. 
As Keegstra illustrates, bitter controversies can arise when teach-
ers communicate and openly subscribe to ideas and values contrary 
to those sanctioned by the community and School Board. While 
Keegstra is an extreme example it prompts the question of whether 
more subtle and hidden forms of racism which conform to the 
dominant interests of Canadian society are being promoted in the 
curriculum. An examination of the way in which natives are por-
trayed in our history books, and the pro-European (ethnocentric) 
approach to education in this country reveals biases which merit 
cause for concern when considered in light of section 27 of the 
Charter. 
The Keegstra case also poses an interesting question regarding 
the extent to which a teacher can deviate from the official curricu-
lum. There is no question that Mr. Keegstra exceeded the limits of 
academic freedom in espousing his Jewish conspiracy theory as the 
only accurate version of history. However, the real issue of aca-
demic freedom and its parameters in public education were not 
explored thoroughly due to the nature of the case and the Board's 
analysis. In determining when academic freedom may be per-
mitted in the classroom, American case law must be considered. 
In the United States, the value of academic freedom has suc-
cessfully challenged the complete authority which school boards 
would otherwise exercise over the curriculum. American case law 
suggests that the claim of academic freedom is legitimate and may 
be utilized in response to school board's accusations that teachers 
have transgressed the permissible boundaries of the curriculum. 
AMERICAN CASE LAW AND ACADEMIC FREEDOM 
Sterzing v. Fort Bend Independent School District 20 is a good ex-
ample of the courts' recognition of the importance of academic 
freedom. In this case, parents objected to a teacher telling his civic 
studies class that he was not opposed to interracial marriages, and 
to his practice of bringing into the classroom alternative readings to 
supplement and expand upon the prescribed material. These com-
20 376 F.Supp. 657 (S.D. Tex. 1972). 
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plaints eventually resulted in the School Board's dismissal of the 
teacher. The Court affirmed Mr. Sterzing's right to express his 
opinions and ordered the school to reinstate him. The Court stated 
that 
it must also be [a] teacher's duty to be exceptionally fair 
and objective in presenting his personally held opinions, 
to actively and persuasively present different views, in 
addition to open discussion. It is the duty of the teacher to 
be cognizant of and sensitive to the feelings of his stu-
dent, their parents, and their community .... 
The Court finds . . . his teaching to be proper to 
stimulate critical thinking, to create an awareness of our 
present political and social community and to enliven 
the educational process. These are desirable goals. 21 
This passage exemplifies how academic freedom may be used in 
conjunction with the official curriculum to enrich the learning ex-
perience. Central to the case was the fact that Mr. Sterzing contin-
ued to follow the curriculum while supplementing it with alterna-
tive viewpoints which encouraged students to think critically about 
the issues being presented. 
The judgment of the court is very similar to two provisions in 
the Nova Scotia Teachers Code of Ethics which state: 
The teacher should avoid giving offense to the religious 
and political beliefs and moral scruples of his/her 
pupils and/or students. 
The teacher should be as objective as possible in 
dealing with controversial matters arising out of the cur-
riculum subjects, whether scientific, or political, 
religious or racial. 2 2 
This issue of the objectivity of the teacher was similarly addressed 
by the Board in Keegstra. In Keegstra, the Board indicated that while 
they were not trying to undermine Mr. Keegstra' s academic 
freedom or intellectual integrity, they did insist that 
all sides of a historical question must be presented in as 
unbiased a way as possible, so that students can judge 
contradictory points for themselves. 23 
21 Ibid. at 662. 
22 Code of Ethics: Nova Scotia Teachers Union, s. l(d), s. l(e). 
23 Supra note 15 at 37 4. 
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Additionally, the Board went on to state that their position was 
consistent with the objectives of the Social Studies Curriculum 
guide which emphasized the "process of developing, testing, and 
substantiating (or falsifying) generalizations [as] amongst the most 
important qualities of true inquiry."24 Collectively, the Nova Scotia 
Teachers Code of Ethics and the above excerpts from Keegstra indi-
cate that Canada may be willing to recognize academic freedom as 
a legitimate pursuit in furtherance of educational goals. 
Thus, although teachers may constitute part of the unofficial 
curriculum as "medium" of the "message,'' this may not necessarily 
result in an absolute restriction of their freedom of expression. The 
critical factors in determining whether expression will be limited 
seem to be the content and form of the alternative message in rela-
tion to the prescribed message. 
In its conclusion, the Court in Sterzing stated: 
Teachers occupy a unique position of trust in our society, 
and they must handle such trust and the instruction of 
young people with great care. On the other hand, a 
teacher must not be manacled with rigid regulations 
which preclude a full adaptation of the course to the 
times in which we live. 25 
In this statement, the court recognizes that a balance is required be-
tween the duty with which teachers are charged and their academic 
freedom. American case law is useful in outlining some of the con-
siderations in determining when a teacher has exceeded the per-
missible levels of academic freedom in public schools. 
In Parducci v. Rutland 26 the court outlined some factors which 
must be considered in determining when a teacher's freedom of 
expression must yield to state interest. In this case, the issue arose as 
to whether a teacher could be dismissed for assigning to his class a 
short story by a prominent contemporary writer. The story made 
references to several vulgar words, an involuntary sexual act, and the 
eradication of the elderly; causing several parents and three students 
to complain. The judge acknowledged the importance of academic 
freedom but stated that it was not absolute: 
24 Ibid. at 375. 
25 Supra note 21 at 661. 
26 316 F.Supp. 352 (M.D. Ala. 1970). 
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It must be balanced against the competing interests of 
society. This Court is keenly aware of the state's vital in-
terest in protecting the impressionable minds of its young 
people from any form of extreme propagandism in the 
classroom. 
A teacher works in a sensitive area in a schoolroom. 
There he shapes the attitudes of young minds towards 
the society in which they live. In this, the state has a vital 
concern. 27 
To allow a teacher academic freedom unfettered is to ignore the 
state's interest, however, to restrict it too much may result in a 
"chilling effect" amongst teachers. The effect of this would be 
teachers' reluctance to exercise their academic freedom and a corre-
sponding impoverishment of the learning environment. In reconcil-
ing the state's interest and the teacher's academic freedom, the 
Court adopted the broad question posed in Tinker v. Des Moines 
Independent Community School, 28 that is, did the conduct result in a 
material and substantial interference in the school? In answering this 
question the Court considered two questions: (a) was the material 
inappropriate having regard to the characteristics of the students 
(age, sophistication); and (b) did the material create a significant 
disruption to the education process. Thus, the Court gave primary 
attention to the content and impact of the alternative message. 
In addressing the first issue, the court held the reading was ap-
propriate for high school juniors, and found nothing obscene in the 
story which was a satirical portrayal of society. In considering the 
second issue, the court found that most students greeted the as-
signment with apathy and therefore the assignment was not one 
which materially or substantially interfered with the operational re-
quirements of the school. The court concluded that the interests of 
academic freedom would prevail where the interests of the state 
were in no way threatened. Thus the alternative message was 
deemed permissible to the degree that it did not undermine the 
state interests and was in some degree related to a discussion of a 
prescribed topic. 
Similarly in Mailloux v. Kiley 29 the same two criteria were used 
to balance the interests of a teacher's academic freedom with the in-
27 Ibid. at 355. 
28 393 U.S. 503 (1969). 
29 323 F.Supp. 1387 (D.Mass. 1971). 
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terests of the state. In that case, a teacher wrote the word "fuck" on 
the blackboard in demonstration of the topic of taboo words. In 
deciding whether the use of the word was justified, the Court con-
sidered (a) the relevancy of the word to the topic being discussed, 
whether it was appropriate having regard to the circumstances; 
(b) whether the word was appropriate having regard to the students 
(age and sophistication); and (c) whether the word had a disturbing 
effect on school operations. The Court held that the word was rele-
vant to the subject being discussed. Additionally, since the affected 
students were in high school and in "low track,'' they were consid-
ered to have enough sophistication to consider the word with the 
educational intent with which it was used without being embar-
rassed or offended. Lastly, the court concluded that the word did 
not having a disturbing effect because most students had probably 
used it or at least seen it before. Having considered all these factors, 
the court decided the word was appropriate and reasonable under 
the circumstances and served a serious educational function. Thus 
the teacher's academic freedom afforded a legitimate response to 
the state interest. 
Brubaker v. Board of Education30 is a good example of when 
academic freedom will not afford a defense. A teacher had ob-
tained brochures from the R-rated movie "Woodstock" and pro-
ceeded to bring them to school. While the teacher only displayed a 
poster in her classroom, she gave the brochures to two teachers who 
proceeded to make them available to their grade eight students. 
The court characterized the brochure by stating that 
to the minds of eighth graders, the brochure's poetry can 
and probably must be fairly read as an alluring invitation 
and a beckoning for them to throw off the dull discipline 
imposed on them by the moral environment of their 
home life, and in exchange to enter into a new world of 
love and freedom-freedom to use acid and grass, free -
dom to take their clothes off and to get an early start in 
the use of such vulgarities as "shit," "fucking," and their 
companions.31 
In considering the issues of relevancy and appropriateness, the court 
held that the brochures had no relevancy to the subjects being 
3o 502 F.2d 973 (1974) (Ill. Ct. App. 1974). 
31 Ibid. at 976. 
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taught by the teachers, nor did the teachers make any attempt to 
discuss the relevancy of the brochures to the students. Additionally, 
the court found that the brochures were inappropriate having regard 
to the age and sophistication of the students. Also significant was 
the meaning conveyed in the brochure which was antithetical to ed-
ucational goals; it was concluded that it promoted a viewpoint con-
trary to school teachings of the harmful effects of alcohol and nar-
cotics, it violated socially acceptable standards, and the language 
used was not consistent with educational standards and objectives. 
Given that the material was inappropriate and could not be consid-
ered to advance the underlying goal of academic freedom (which is 
the furtherance of knowledge and truth), there was no need for the 
court to go on to consider whether the expression impaired the ef-
ficient operation of the school. 
Brubaker would probably have been decided similarly in 
Canada because the alternative message totally undermined the 
prescribed message. The Education Act states teachers must 
regularly give appropriate instruction as to the nature of 
alcoholic drinks, narcotics and tobacco and special em -
phasis on their effect upon the human system.32 
The Code of Ethics also states that teachers should avoid giving of-
fense to the religious, political, and morals scruples of students and 
parents.33 Given these two provisions, the brochure would probably 
also have been deemed inappropriate in a Canadian context. 
Generally, the American case law indicates that a court will consider 
three factors in determining whether academic freedom is permis-
sible having regard to state interests: 
1. is the material (message) relevant to the subject or topic be-
ing discussed; 
2. is the material (message) appropriate having consideration 
of the age and sophistication of the students, and the goals 
and values of education; and 
3. if these two criteria are met, then the court considers 
whether the material (message) resulted in a substantial and 
material disruption in the school's operations. That is, does 
32 Supra note 8 at s. 54(£). 
33 Supra note 21 at s. I(d). 
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the alternative message conflict with the prescribed message 
such that a material disruption occurs. 
Canadian case law has yet to determine the permissive boundaries it 
will afford academic freedom where public education is concerned. 
Discussions tend to focus more on the nature of academic freedom 
at the university and college level. Given that the nature and extent 
of intellectual inquiry differs at this level from the elementary level, 
a perusal of case law in this area will not be considered. However, 
Keegstra is an important case in at least indicating that boards are 
aware of academic freedom as a possible relevant topic in discus-
sions of teachers' adherence to prescribed curriculums. However, 
the degree to which teachers are permitted to depart from or sup-
plement the curriculum is still an unknown factor. Perhaps if these 
issues arise in Canada, American case law may be useful in indicat-
ing an approach. However, of great significance will also be the na-
ture of expression and whether it undermines the values upon which 
freedom of expression and the educational system are founded. 
FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION OUTSIDE THE 
CLASSROOM 
The nature of a teacher's duties, it can be argued, transgress the 
boundaries of the classroom. The crux of this argument is the 
premise that while a teacher is within the confines of the school she 
or he functions as a role model who upholds the principles and val-
ues upon which the school system is based. For a teacher to chal-
lenge those values once outside the physical confines of the school 
would undermine the credibility of those values and thus send an 
alternative message to students. Prior discussions of academic free-
dom focused both on the substance of the alternative message and 
the legitimacy the teacher gave to this message due to their status as 
the medium. Discussions of freedom of expression outside the 
classroom will similarly focus on the teacher as medium of a mes-
sage. The teacher's role is so powerful that the relationship of 
medium and message continues outside of the classroom. As stated 
by Manley-Casmir and Piddocke: 
Public teachers, especially in a small town or a rural 
community, are rather like goldfish in a goldfish bowl: 
their behaviour is always open to public inspection and 
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censure. School authorities, public authorities, the parents 
of the teachers' students, and members of the surround-
ing community scrutinize the teachers' acts and are ready 
to pass judgment on them. 34 
The Education Act is silent on the question of teachers' freedom 
of expression outside the classroom, except for subsection 54(e) 
which may be interpreted to extend a teachers duty beyond the 
classroom. 35 This section directs the teacher by precept and 
example to encourage in students a respect for religion, truth, 
justice and other democratic values. The Code of Ethics 36 can be 
understood to compensate for any deficiencies in the Education Act 
on this issue. Teachers have a great impact upon their students and 
the Code of Ethics reflects this and reveals the need for teachers in 
their activities outside the classroom not to undermine the 
confidence and security of their students and the education system. 
The most relevant sections in the Code deal with teacher-pupil, 
teacher-teacher, teacher-internal administration, and teacher-
community interaction: 
The teacher should avoid giving offense to the religious 
and political beliefs and moral scruples of his/her pupils 
and their parents. 
The teacher should not make defamatory, conde-
scending, embarrassing, or offensive comments concern-
ing another teacher. 
The teacher should observe a reasonable and proper 
loyalty to the internal administration of the school. 
The teacher should so conduct himself/herself in 
his/her private life that no dishonor may befall him/her 
or his/her profession. 37 
These sections indicate that a teacher's freedom of expression is 
subject to scrutiny both within and outside the confines of the class-
room. Ultimately, a teacher's freedom of expression must be bal-
anced against the right of the school board to conduct its operation 
efficiently and without disruption. Since teachers are public em-
34 M. E. Manley-Casimir & S. M. Piddocke, "Teachers in a Goldfish Bowl: A 
Case of 'Misconduct'" (1990) 3 Edu. & L.]. 115 at 116. 
35 Supra note 10. 
36 Supra note 22. 
37 Supra note 22 at ss. I(a), II(a), III(a), and VJI(a) respectively. 
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ployees, the extent of their freedom of expression outside of the 
classroom is comparable to other public employees. 
Fraser v. Public Service Staff Relations Board 38 effectively ad-
dresses the question of the extent of public employees' freedom of 
expression. It indicates that freedom of expression for a public em-
ployee is not unrestricted. In Fraser, the right of a public employee 
to speak freely on important public issues was balanced against the 
government's interest in maintaining efficiency of operations and 
the confidence of the public. 
In this case, Mr. Fraser (hired as a tax audit manager) publicly 
criticized the government on radio and television stations for its 
metric conversion program and its intention to institute the 
Charter. This criticism continued despite warnings and directives 
from his superiors that it should cease and eventually Mr. Fraser 
was discharged. The Public Service Staff Relations Board recog-
nized that a balance had to be reached between Mr. Fraser's free-
dom of expression and the government's desire to maintain a public 
service "characterized by professionalism and impartiality."39 
The Board stated that inherent in being a public employee is a 
duty to refrain from doing anything which would create a doubt 
about the ability and impartiality of public servants. Furthermore, 
the Board stated it is imperative for the Canadian public to have 
confidence in the impartiality, fairness, and integrity of public ser-
vants because of the latitude and impact they have on Canadian 
lives through their administration and implementation of 
Government policy. The Board held that Mr. Fraser's actions cre-
ated a doubt about his ability to be impartial and fair in his dealings 
with clients. Secondly, his actions were construed as likely to un-
dermine the confidence and trust of the Canadian public in the 
public service which would impair the functioning of the depart-
ment. Commenting on both of these factors the Board stated: 
A public servant simply cannot be allowed under the 
rubric of free speech to cultivate distrust of the employer 
amongst members of the constituency whom he is 
obliged to serve. I am satisfied that Mr. Fraser cast doubt 
on his effectiveness as a government employee once he 
escalated his criticism of Government policy to a point 
and in a form that far exceeded the issues of general 
38 [1985] 2 S.C.R. 455. 
39 Ibid. at 460. 
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public interest ... his incipient and persistent campaign 
in opposition to the incumbent Government conflicted 
with the continuation of his employment relationship. 
Once that situation arose he either had to cease his activ-
ities or resign from the position he occupied. 4o 
Thus in reaching their decision, the Board considered the nature of 
public employment and the necessity for employees to appear im-
partial and fair. Since the integrity of the public service is connected 
to the integrity of its employees, the nature and effect of the com-
ments were relevant. The Board found that the prolonged and visi-
ble criticisms of government were likely to undermine public confi-
dence in the government and to elicit doubt regarding the impartial 
and judicious nature of government and the public service. 
On appeal the Supreme Court of Canada stated that a certain 
balance is required: the "value of freedom of speech must be quali-
fied by the value of an impartial and effective public service."41 The 
Court felt the appropriate starting point for any discussion of a 
public employee's freedom of expression begins with the premise 
that they are entitled to some freedom of expression. The Court 
went on to state that inherent in accepting a government job is the 
acceptance of certain restraints. A public employee is under a duty 
to respect these restraints, which the Court defines as knowledge, 
fairness, and integrity. Any conduct which creates a doubt about a 
public employee's ability to deal with clients on this basis brings the 
public service into disrepute. Loyalty is another characteristic which 
a public servant owes to the employer. To hold otherwise would 
create a situation in which government would lack faith in the abil-
ity and integrity of public employees in implementing its policies. 
Having regard to these factors, the Court held that there are only 
three circumstances in which a public servant could criticize the 
government: (a) if it is engaged in illegal acts; (b) if its policies jeop-
ardize the life, health, or safety of the servants or citizens; or (c) if 
the criticism has no impact on the actual or perceived ability of the 
servant to effectively perform his or her duties. 
Mr. Fraser's comments could only be afforded protection if 
they fell within the third category since the other two were not 
applicable. There were two essential questions asked by the Court: 
40 Re Fraser and Treasury Board (Department of National Revenue) (1982), 5 
LA.C. (3d) 193 at 226. 
41 Supra note 38 at 463. 
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(1) was there an impairment in the performance of the specific job 
because of the effect on clients, and (2) was there impairment to the 
public service because of the special and important characteristics of 
that job.42 Central to the Court's analysis of both these questions 
was the idea of an actual or perceived impairment. In addressing 
this question the Court held that direct evidence of impairment 
while preferable will not prohibit a reasonable inference of impair-
ment. An inference is permissible when the job is of an important 
and sensitive nature and when the form, substance, and context of 
the criticism is extreme. In this case, the Board was at liberty to 
draw an inference of impairment given the duration and pattern of 
Mr. Fraser's behavior. His behavior was regarded as sufficient to 
raise "public concern, unease and distrust of his ability to perform 
his employment duties."43 
Thus in determining the degree of restraint required, it is neces-
sary to consider the nature of the public employee's position (duties 
and visibility) and the comments made (substance, form, and con-
text). Brown and Kilcoyne argue that these "standards ... are elas-
tic ... and raise concerns of consistency and predictability" which 
will cause a chilling effect amongst public employees.44 Central to 
this point is the distinction that some speech will obviously be pro-
tected while other speech will not. For example, 
whereas it is obvious that it would not be "just cause" for 
a provincial Government to dismiss a provincial clerk who 
stood on a crowd on a Sunday afternoon to protest 
provincial day care policies, it is equally obvious that the 
same Government would have "just cause" to dismiss the 
Deputy Minister of Social Services who spoke vigorously 
against the same policies at the same rally. 45 
Interestingly, Mr. Fraser was a tax auditor who spoke out on the is-
sue of the Charter and metric conversion. These issues seem to have 
very little connection to his duties. As noted by Petraglia, "the 
Court seemed to be more upset by the form in which the criticism 
took than its actual content."46 It could be argued that the Court's 
42 Ibid at 472. 
43 Supra note 38 at 472-73. 
44 R. Brown & J. Kilcoyne, "Developments in Employment Law: The 1985-86 
Term" (1987) 9 Supreme Court Review 325 at 343. 
45 Supra note 38 at 468. 
46 P. Petraglia, "Public Servants and Free Speech" (1986) 2 Admin.L.J. 6 at 9. 
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approach leaves a serious question about the weight to be given the 
nature of employment, and the nature of the comment (content, 
form, and context) which could seriously affect the extent of 
speech afforded to public employees and lead to inconsistent 
judgments. 
FRASER IN AN EDUCATIONAL CONTEXT 
Teachers are government employees and thus should expect that 
their freedom of expression may in some way be constrained, espe-
cially due to the sensitive and important nature of their jobs. Thus 
any consideration of their freedom of expression outside school 
hours could be subject to a Fraser-type analysis in which comments 
(content, form, and context) which lead to any actual or perceived 
impairment of the functioning of the School or their ability to per-
form the duties of a teacher (as defined in subsection 54(e) 
Education Act) may not be protected. Additionally, failing direct 
evidence of impairment, a court may infer impairment having 
regard to the content, form, and context of their expression. 
Attis v. New Brunswick (School District 15)47 is probably the 
most publicized case which exemplifies the degree to which teach-
ers may be held accountable for their actions during non-school 
hours. Malcolm Ross was a teacher in New Brunswick who had 
written several anti-Semitic books, including, Web of Deceit, The 
Real Holocaust, Spectre of Power, and Christianity vs. ]udeo-
Christianity. In addition to publishing these books, Ross also sub-
mitted letters to the editor and granted interviews during which he 
reiterated his anti-Semitic ideas. These publications generated a 
lot of publicity and debate and eventually forced the question of 
whether a teacher's freedom of expression outside of school was 
something which the school board had the authority to restrict. 
The publicity surrounding Ross' activities and his position 
within the New Brunswick education system attracted the attention 
of both the local and national community. The Premier of New 
Brunswick, Hon. Frank McKenna, was very prompt to indicate that 
the opinions and beliefs held by Ross were not in any way represen-
tative of the New Brunswick community or the quality of educa-
47 (1992), 121 N.B.R. (2d) 1 (Bd. oflnquiry under the Human Rights Act). 
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tion in New Brunswick. Speaking on the Malcolm Ross affair, 
Premier McKenna stated: 
I would like to see some action taken against Mr. Ross 
that would make it very clear that his beliefs do not rep-
resent the beliefs of New Brunswickers and the system of 
education is not brought into dispute .... I'm concerned 
that a person who is a publicly-paid employee is enunciat-
ing beliefs totally contrary to those being taught in the 
education system .... 48 
Similar comments were made by the Minister of Education and 
other legislative members. A strong attempt was made on the part 
of government officials to dissociate the provincial educational sys-
tem from the allegations of racism and bigotry surrounding 
Malcolm Ross. The strong reactions of politicians would indicate 
that the public perception of education in New Brunswick was af-
fected by Ross' activities. The comments of McKenna and other 
legislative members also indicate that in any society the education 
system is a symbol. Within a Canadian context, which in theory 
subscribes to the idea of multiculturalism, the education system at a 
very minimum is expected to give the appearance of equality and 
tolerance. For example, during the heat of the controversy, the 
School Board adopted a multicultural policy with the official in-
tention of providing an atmosphere of mutual respect for individual 
rights and freedoms, and to ensure that multiculturalism formed an 
integral part of the school system. Teachers were asked to comply 
with the policy. Ross' ability and credibility in promoting these val-
ues and beliefs at minimum conflicted with his publicized activities. 
By analogy with a Brubaker 49 type analysis, Ross' conduct un-
dermined the values which the education system was attempting to 
further. 
Also relevant, however, was the indication that Ross' activities 
had an impact on his ability or perceived ability to perform the du-
ties of a teacher. As indicated in McKenna's comments, Ross' activ-
ities were inconsistent with the role required of a teacher in uphold-
ing educational and "Canadian" values. Thus Ross' activities consti-
tuted a message which was inconsistent with his role as teacher. 
48 Re Ross and Board of School Trustees, District No. 15 (1990), 78 DLR (4th) 
392 at 401 (N.B.C.A.). 
49 Supra note 30. 
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Under a Fraser 50 type analysis, Ross' activities seemed to create a 
doubt about his ability to sustain fairness and integrity in his deal-
ings with students and in his ability, or perceived ability, to give 
credibility to school and community sanctioned values and objec-
tives. 
In addition to repeatedly asking Ross to refrain from further 
publications and discussion of his beliefs, the School Board also 
stated that the hostility which he was generating was interfering 
with the tolerance the school was required to show for the beliefs of 
students and their families. This statement is similar to the provi-
sion in the Nova Scotia Code of Ethics which states that a teacher 
should avoid offending the religious, political, and moral scruples 
of his students and parents.s 1 
As noted by Givan perhaps the most striking feature of the 
Malcolm Ross affair was the reluctance on the part of the School 
Board, Education Department, and New Brunswick Teachers' 
Association to get involved.s2 Givan aptly notes that: 
Lamentably the School Board was prepared to accept the 
damage being done to its reputation rather than test its 
erroneous presumption that teaching was not connected 
with the integrity of the teacher .... 
Like the School Board, both the professional associa-
tion and the Department [of Education] chose a less than 
proactive stance, seemingly content to weather the storm 
of controversy impugning the practice of education. 53 
The role parents and the community played in attempting to 
effect a solution to the Ross affair is a reminder of the influence 
they exert over the education system. Attis, a parent who launched 
a complaint with the New Brunswick Human Rights Commission 
(NBHRC) against the School Board, successfully argued that Ross, in 
being allowed to serve in the capacity of teacher, provided a racist 
and anti-Jewish role model for students. The School Board, in fail-
ing to act, had thus violated section 5 of the New Brunswick Human 
Rights Act 54 by creating a poisoned environment for Jewish and 
so Supra note 38. 
5! Supra note 22 at s. I(d). 
52 D. Givan, "The Ross Decision and Control in Professional Employment" 
(1992) 41 U.N.B.L.J. 333 at 334. 
s3 Ibid. 
54 R.S.N.B. 1973, c. H-11. 
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other minority students which ultimately hindered their ability to 
derive equal benefits from the education system. 
At issue was the vested interest that every group and individual 
has in the education system. School boards are relied on to maintain 
the integrity of the system by guarding against "messages" in-
consistent with community and school values. A failure to discharge 
this responsibility will undoubtedly attract the attention of various 
groups within society. This case demonstrates this point because it 
was not only Attis challenging the passivity of the school board, it 
was also the Canadian Jewish Congress (who was admitted as a 
party), and many other non-party individuals and groups. 
In finding a solution, the Board utilized a Fraser 55 type of 
analysis. The Board of Inquiry noted that the School Board, as 
Ross' employer, had a responsibility to parents, students, and the 
community. Their responsibility was to create a learning environ-
ment free from the effects of discrimination that was, or had the 
appearance of being, fair and impartial. Ross' activities challenged 
the integrity of the system by creating a poisoned atmosphere in 
which Jewish and other minority students felt fear, anger, and iso-
lation. Thus Ross' off-duty conduct can be understood as having 
detrimentally undermined his position as a teacher, as well as the 
impartiality and reputation of the school. Lastly, the board stated 
that teachers are role models and off-duty conduct can fall within 
the scope of the employment relationship. The Board thus con-
cluded that an appropriate standard of moral conduct must be 
maintained inside and outside the classroom. 
In its analysis, the Board stated that: 
Education of students must be viewed in the broad con-
text of including not only the formal curriculum but the 
more informal aspects of education that come through 
interchange and participation in the whole school envi-
ronment .... A school board has a duty to maintain a 
positive school environment for all persons served by it 
and it must be ever vigilant of anything that might inter-
fere with that duty.56 
These comments suggest that a School Board has a duty to restrict 
any conduct which impacts negatively on the school environment. 
55 Supra note 38. 
56 Supra note 4 at 60, 80. 
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The integrity of the school is intricately connected with the actual 
and perceived integrity of teachers. It is important to stress at this 
point that a teacher's duty is not limited to the teaching of a sub-
ject. It also includes the duty to act as a role model in upholding 
the values expressed in subsection 54(e) of the Education Act. While 
Ross was no longer technically functioning in the capacity of 
teacher, his label as "teacher" (and therefore the "medium") sur-
passed the boundaries of the classroom and was sufficient to subject 
his actions to scrutiny. In discharging this responsibility, school 
boards are advised to take a proactive approach. The Board made a 
number of orders, the most relevant to this paper is that Ross was 
denied the right to teach. 
It seems clear under the Board's effects-oriented analysis that a 
school can justifiably restrict a teacher's freedom of expression if 
that expression proves to be disruptive to the efficiency of educa-
tion in the school. Thus the content of a teacher's speech outside 
class hours may still be subject to restrictions if it is inconsistent 
with school-sanctioned messages. Reynolds indicates that 
problems arise when a teacher, in connection with such 
ideologies which are unacceptable to the mainstream of 
the community, becomes involved in activities which are 
brought to the public's attention. The question then be-
comes does such knowledge adversely affect the stu-
dents .... [I]f speech or activity presents danger to the 
status quo of the educational system, there is a sufficient 
clear and present danger for the state to take steps to si -
lence that menace. 57 
Unfortunately, the Board's order was appealed to the Court of 
Queen's Bench and finally up to the New Brunswick Court of 
Appeal. The Court of Appeal quashed Ross' removal from the class-
room as an unreasonable violation of his section 2 Charter rights.58 
The issue defined by the Court of Appeal was whether the fear 
that the public might perceive the School Board as condoning Ross' 
beliefs was enough to limit his freedom of expression. Phrasing the 
issue in this way allowed the Court to do two things: (1) to mini-
mize the discriminatory nature of Ross' comments and the purpose 
of the NBHRC effects-oriented order in combating this type of per-
57 J. L. Reynolds, "Free Speech Rights of Public School Teachers: A Proposed 
Balancing Test" (1982) 30 Clev. St. L. Rev. 673 at 695. 
58 Attis v. Board of Education of District 15 et al (1993), N.B.R. (2d) 1 (C.A.). 
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vasive, highly detrimental, and invisible discrimination; and (2) to 
proceed through an analysis which failed to consider any of the ob-
jectives underlying the Charter's guarantee of freedom of expres-
sion, as considered in the first part of this paper. For these two rea-
sons, the Court of Appeal judgment is inherently flawed. 
In reaching its decision concerning whether silencing Ross' anti-
Semitic comments was sufficient to override his Charter rights, the 
court gave minimal attention to the significance of Ross' occupa-
tion. Instead it focused on the fact that there was no direct evidence 
which would establish that Ross' comments were connected to the 
discriminatory remarks the Attis' children and other Jewish chil-
dren were being subjected to in the schoolyard. By doing this the 
Court rejected the public perception test in Fraser in favour of an 
actual impairment test that was provable, and not to be inferred 
from evidence. The majority of the Court did recognize, however, 
that 
[t]eachers do indeed enjoy a high status in our society 
and have a unique opportunity to influence youthful 
minds. Having said that, however, the sanction, curtail-
ment of Mr. Ross' freedom of expression, must be con -
sidered in the context of the evidence.59 
Inherent in this decision is a choice to give credence to a minute 
part of Fraser (actual impairment and direct evidence), and ignore a 
significant part of it which focusses on public perception and the in-
ference of evidence where sensitive and important jobs are con-
cerned. The impetus for this conservative approach was the Court's 
concern that to do otherwise would create a legal space whereby 
teachers' freedom of expression could be unjustifiably limited. By 
instituting a high evidentiary requirement, the Court effectively 
limited the capacity of School Board to deal with future similar sit-
uations. 
The dissent by Ryan]. recognized that freedom of expression is 
not an absolute right; it must be interpreted in a way which is con-
sistent with its underlying values and principles which are integral 
within a free and democratic society. 
Included in these are the inherent dignity of the human 
being, commitment to social justice and equality and 
respect for cultural and group identity. To give free reign 
59 Ibid. at 19. 
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to the asserted freedom of speech and religion of Ross 
would be to trample upon these underlying values and 
principles, themselves having the status of entrenched 
rights under the Charter and in international law.60 
Thus Ryan J. found that the NBHRC order was sufficiently tailored 
with regard to proportionality, rational connection, and minimal 
impairment to stand. Additionally, Ryan J. concluded that Ross, as 
a teacher, public servant, and role model, should not be permitted 
to promote his ideas while occupying the position and accompany-
ing duties and obligations of a teacher. 
Ultimately the dissent by Ryan J. is consistent with other deci-
sions which have found that actual or perceived impairment is suf-
ficient to limit a teacher's conduct both inside and outside the 
classroom. The majority's decision in the case can be considered an 
anomaly which has yet to be tested and followed by other cases. 
Significantly, in Re Cromer and British Columbia Teachers' 
Federation6 1 a Fraser62-type analysis with an emphasis on per-ceived 
impairment was used to limit a teacher's expression. 
In Re Cromer, Ms. Sauve, a guidance counselor, had developed a 
program on human sexuality for boys and girls in junior high school. 
As part of the program, two lists of questions typically asked by 
boys and girls were circulated amongst students. Some of the 
questions presented were objectionable to parents either because of 
the subject matter or the colloquial language used to pose the 
question. A meeting of the Parents' Advisory Committee was held 
to address concerns over the questions. Mrs. Cromer, herself a 
teacher at another school and the parent of a child attending the 
school, attended the meeting. During the meeting, an angry ex-
change occurred between Mrs. Cromer and Ms. Sauve in which Mrs. 
Cromer publicly criticized Ms. Sauve's responses to parents' 
concerns at the meeting. Ms. Sauve subsequently initiated a charge 
against Mrs. Cromer for violating clause 5 of the Code of Ethics. 63 
Clause 5 prohibits public criticism of another teacher by a teacher. 
In her defense, Mrs. Cromer argued that her statements were not as a 
teacher, but as a parent and thus the Code of Ethics did not apply. 
60 Ibid at 36. 
61 (1986), 29 D.L.R. (4th) 641 (B.C. C.A.). 
62 Supra note 38. 
63 B. C. Teachers' Federation's Code of Ethics, cl . 5. 
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Additionally, she argued that clause 5 violated her freedom of ex-
pression as guaranteed by subsection 2(b) of the Charter. 
In arriving at its judgment the court made two very important 
points. Firstly, the Court stated that: 
Mrs. Cromer does not always speak as a teacher, nor does 
she always speak as a parent. But she always speaks as 
Mrs. Cromer. The perception of her by her audience will 
depend on their knowledge of her training, her skills, her 
experience, and her occupation, among other things. 64 
What emerges as a critical factor is the audience's perception of 
Mrs. Cromer. Thus even though her intent may have been to speak 
as a parent, the audience's perception of her status as "teacher" will 
be enough to contextualize her expression as such. This analysis 
begs the question of when and if a teacher's expression can ever be 
perceived as falling outside the confines of "teacher." This is consis-
tent with the idea that the teacher's role transcends into spheres 
outside the classroom. 
Secondly, the Court balanced Mrs. Cramer's freedom of ex-
pression against the purpose of the Code of Ethics. 65 The Code can be 
interpreted as representing the Board's interest because the Board 
has an interest (as does the public) in reducing disharmony amongst 
teachers, increasing the beneficial effects of criticism, and thus 
promoting a harmonious and productive educational environment. 
The extent to which teachers are able to work co-operatively and 
constructively will no doubt influence their actual and perceived 
ability to do their job. The Court balanced this interest inherent in 
the purpose of the clause against Mrs. Cromer' s interest in her 
freedom of expression. The Court found that 
if Mrs. Cromer' s comments had been directed to the 
subject matter ... then I would have considered that the 
public interest in letting her speak out should have over -
ridden the Code of Ethics .... But Mrs. Cromer's com-
ments were not directed to the subject-matter of the 
meeting ... they are outside the scope of any aspect of 
the public interest .... 66 
64 Supra note 61 at 660. 
65 Supra note 63. 
66 Supra note 61 at 661. 
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While the passage indicates that both the public and school board 
have an interest in the efficient operation of the school, the Court 
also suggests there is a public interest in limiting expression to 
comments related to the purpose of the meeting. In essence, had 
Mrs. Cromer spoken to this interest, her comments would not have 
been inconsistent with the school and public interest and thus there 
would be little or no perceived or actual impairment. Notable in the 
Court's conclusion is a consideration of Mrs. Cramer's comments 
in her role as teacher and also a consideration of the comments in 
terms of content, form, and context. 
Attis (Bd of Inquiry) and Re Cromer indicate that the perception 
of an individual as a teacher is sufficient to justify scrutiny of their 
conduct for any possible inconsistency with school sanctioned ob-
jectives or values and thus trigger the test in Fraser. If the expression 
does not conflict with prescribed "messages" and objectives then 
the teacher's role as "medium" is unimpaired. However, if the ex-
pression is inconsistent with school "messages" and objectives the 
teacher must be held accountable. Any inconsistency between pre-
scribed and alternative messages or indiscretions by teachers dimin-
ishes their effectiveness as the "mediums" and thus the impact and 
credibility of any prescribed message. To this end attention is paid 
to the content, form and context of speech in relation to the role of 
the teacher in determining whether the expression undermined the 
interest and functioning of the school. 
FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION OUTSIDE THE 
CLASSROOM: THE AMERICAN APPROACH 
The primary focus in Canadian case law seems to be an emphasis on 
actual or perceived impairment in job efficiency or the functioning 
of the workplace as determined by considering the occupation and 
the nature of the comment (content, form, and context). 
Differentially, the American case law primarily focusses on whether 
the speech was on a topic of public concern. If it is, then the court 
proceeds to balance the right of the employee to comment on issues 
of public concern versus the right of the employer to have efficiency 
of operations. Although this seems similar in some respects to the 
Canadian approach there are some notable differences between the 
FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION AND TEACHERS 65 
two approaches. The American approach can be summarized in two 
cases, Pickering v. Board of Education 67 and Connick v. Myers. 68 
Pickering 69 established a balancing test which is used to de-
termine the parameters of a teacher's freedom of speech outside the 
classroom. Pickering, a teacher in Illinois, wrote a letter to the local 
paper criticizing the School Board's lack of candour in regard to a 
proposed tax increase, the purpose of which was to raise revenue for 
the school. The letter criticized the Board's allocation of funds be-
tween educational and athletic programs, and stated that school 
administration spent too much money on athletics. 
While Pickering claimed his statements were protected by free-
dom of expression, the Board took objection to the letter for several 
reasons. The Board claimed that (1) the statements in the letter 
were false; (2) the letter cast doubt on the integrity and competence 
of the Board; (3) the statements damaged the professional reputa-
tions of its members and school administrators; and ( 4) the state-
ments were disruptive to faculty discipline, and would encourage 
controversy and conflict among teachers, administrators, the Board, 
and the community. 
In arriving at its decision the Court stated: 
The problem in any case is to arrive at a balance between 
the interests of the teacher, as a citizen, in commenting 
upon matters of public concern and the interest of the 
State, as an employer, in promoting the efficiency of the 
public services it performs through its employees. 70 
Conspicuously absent from this approach is any concern that the 
teacher (as a public employee) should give the appearance of im-
partiality. The matter simply is analyzed on the basis of competing 
interests. Pickering's interest in speaking as a private citizen on an is-
sue of public concern was balanced against the efficiency of the 
public service. In concluding that Pickering's freedom of speech 
outbalanced the Board's interest in this particular case, the Court 
stated that: (1) the statements were not directed towards co-work-
ers or immediate supervisors, with whom Pickering would be in 
daily contact; (2) discipline and harmony in the immediate work-
67 391 U.S. 563 (1968). 
68 461 U.S. 138 (1983). 
69 Supra note 67. 
7o Ibid. at 568. 
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place were not endangered; (3) Pickering's performance of his daily 
duties was not disrupted, nor was the regular functioning of the 
school; (4) personal loyalty and confidence were not a requirement 
of the relationship between Pickering and the superintendent or 
Board; (5) the statements which were erroneous were easily coun-
tered as the facts were a matter of public record, and additionally 
the statements were not made with the knowledge they were false 
nor with reckless disregard of their validity; (6) public reaction was 
one of apathy and disbelief and thus cannot be said to have dam-
aged the professional reputations of the Board, superintendent, and 
administrators; (7) there was no evidence that the letter caused con-
troversy and conflict between teachers, community, Board and 
administrators; and (8) the letter addressed an issue which was of 
public concern and thus free debate should be encouraged rather 
than inhibited. 
Schiumo,71 Ellis,72 and Johnson73 have criticized the Pickering 
test as being too broad and thus too unpredictable to function as a 
rule of law. Johnson argues that the lack of definite issues to be 
considered in balancing interests leaves the test susceptible to a wide 
range of discretion which ultimately has the effect of undermining 
the right to freedom of expression. Ellis also suggests that the 
criteria represent "things subject to balancing, a kind of judicial 
acrobatics with no clear nor distinct rules by which the balance 
could be determined."74 
Connick v. Myers75 refined the test enunciated in Pickering.76 In 
the Connick case, Myers (a government employee) circulated a 
questionnaire among office workers subsequent to finding out that 
she was to be transferred. The questionnaire was designed to gauge 
employee opinions about transfer policies, office moral, the need 
for a grievance committee, level of confidence in superiors, and 
whether employees felt pressured to work in political campaigns. 
71 M. ]. K. Schiumo, "A Proposal for Rethinking the 'Of Public Concern' 
Requirement of Pickering" (1992) 14 Comm. & L. 51. 
72 J. A. Ellis, "Public Teachers' Right to Free Speech: 'A Matter of Public 
Concern'" (1986) 12 So.U. L. Rev. 217. 
73 V. K. Johnson, "Ferrara v. Mills: The A, B, C's of the Public Educator's 
Freedom of Expression" (1987) 13 J. Contemp. L. 181. 
74 Supra note 72 at 221. 
75 Supra note 68. 
76 Supra note 67. 
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Her departmental supervisor considered the questionnaire to be an 
act of insubordination and dismissed Myers. 
In determining whether the dismissal amounted to a violation 
of Myers' freedom of speech, the court imposed a two step test. 
First it had to be determined whether Myers comments were on is-
sues of public concern. If this criterion was satisfied then the court 
would consider whether Myers' right to comment on issues of pub-
lic concern outbalanced the right of the department to promote ef-
ficiency of services. 
The Court held that whether an issue was of public concern had 
to be determined by having regard to the content, form, and con-
text of the whole statement. Ellis characterizes this as a subjective 
test which focusses on what was said, how it was said, and when it 
was said.77 At this point, the onus is on the employee to show that 
the speech is protected and that it was a substantial factor in the 
decision to terminate. The Court found that most of the questions 
were not related to issues of public concern except for the last item 
(whether employees felt pressured to work on political campaigns), 
which was by its nature an issue of public concern. 
The Court then proceeded to apply the Pickering balancing test. 
As noted in Connick, this required "full consideration of the gov-
ernment's interest in the effective and efficient fulfilment of its re-
sponsibilities to the public" and the degree to which the speech in-
terfered with this interest.78 In gauging whether interference oc-
curred, the Court considered the content of the speech, the man-
ner, time and place of the speech, and the context of the speech as 
manifested in the circumstances surrounding it. Additionally, the 
Court held that actual disturbance is not necessary and that a mere 
threat or fear of disturbance is sufficient to warrant employer ac-
tion. However, Ellis suggests that the employer should be required 
to show "something more than a mere desire to avoid the discom-
fort and unpleasantness that always accompany an unpopular view-
point."79 While Myers ability to perform her work was found to be 
unhindered, her conduct was held to undermine and jeopardize the 
close working relationship employees had with their superiors. 
Connick v. Myers has been interpreted as undermining funda-
mental rights and freedoms by holding that where the expression 
77 Supra note 72 at 225. 
78 Supra note 68 at 150. 
79 Supra note 72 at 248. 
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falls outside matters of public concern the speech will not be pro-
tected. 80 This seems to indicate that an employee's interest in 
freedom of expression vis-a-vis the employer's interest in efficiency, 
will not be protected unless the expression is directed toward a 
matter of public concern. Interestingly, Connick defines "any mat-
ter of political, social, or other concern to the community" as an is-
sue of public concern.81 Johnson suggests that the error in this ap-
proach is that undue emphasis is given to the content of the speech 
as opposed to the effect of the speech. 82 
FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION OUTSIDE THE 
CLASSROOM: AMERICAN AND CANADIAN 
COMPARISONS 
It is useful to consider differences and similarities between the ap-
proaches of Canadian and American courts to freedom of expres-
sion outside the classroom and its implications for educators. 
The Fraser test is based on the presumption that the employee 
owes a duty of loyalty to the government. This is essential since the 
employee implements and upholds government policy. Because 
public confidence is dependent on the public employee's ability to 
appear impartial and fair, there will be some restraint on the em-
ployees freedom of expression. Thus the premise from which a 
Canadian analysis starts is that the public employee is entitled to 
some freedom of expression. In an educational context, if teachers 
can be understood as the medium of the school curriculum, then 
the success of the message depends on the teacher's loyalty and ad-
herence to principles and values enunciated in the official curricu-
lum. Thus "messages" inside and outside the school are subject to 
scrutiny for any inconsistency with prescribed "messages." 
Interestingly, the American approach enunciated in Connick 
states the following: 
For at least 15 years, it has been settled that a State can-
not condition public employment on a basis that in-
so Supra note 71. 
81 Supra note 68 at 146. 
82 Supra note 73 at 191. 
FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION AND TEACHERS 
fringes the employee's constitutionally protected interest 
in freedom of expression. 83 
69 
Thus the occupation of an individual would not seem to have any 
effect on the extent of their freedom of expression. It is from this 
starting point that American courts balance the employee's freedom 
of speech and the employer's business interest in promoting effi-
ciency of services. However, in limiting protection to matters of 
public concern and defining this as political, social, and other mat-
ters of concern to the community, Connick effectively limits the 
public employee's freedom of speech. Thus both Canadian and 
American approaches have constraints; the Canadian approach con-
strains expression by imposing principles of loyalty, fairness, and 
impartiality, while the American approach constrains speech by im-
posing the concept of public interest. The latter is potentially more 
oppressive because what is deemed to constitute an issue of public 
interest is inherently determined by those with political and eco-
nomic power. 
While the objective of both approaches is to limit freedom of 
expression which detrimentally impacts on the work environment, 
different steps are taken in achieving this end. The Canadian ap-
proach focusses on actual impairment or perceived impairment on 
the workplace or an employee's ability to adequately perform his or 
her job. In contrast, the American approach focusses on an actual 
disturbance or apprehension of disturbance in the employer's effi-
ciency of operations. 
The evidentiary requirements for proving an actual or perceived 
impairment differ from those required to prove an actual or appre-
hended disturbance. 84 Canadian law allows an inference of im-
pairment, while American law requires evidence that an actual dis-
turbance or apprehension of disturbance has occurred. The 
Canadian approach is broader in this respect because as Stushnoff 
notes: 
It would be very difficult for an employee to convince an 
adjudicator that certain public comments did not call 
into question the impartiality of the civil service when no 
evidence of impairment is needed to prove that the pub-
83 Supra note 68 at 142. 
84 S. Stushnoff, "The Freedom to Criticize One's Employer" in Foster, supra 
note 1at34. 
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lie' s perception of the employee's impartiality was im-
paired. 85 
The last notable point of comparison between the two ap-
proaches is the use they make of the content, form, and context in 
assessing whether an employee's expression will be protected. The 
American case law considers these factors in determining whether 
the employee's speech is in the public interest. Differentially, in 
Canadian case law these factors are relevant in determining whether 
the employee's expression resulted in an actual or perceived im-
pairment in job efficiency or the functioning of the workplace. 
There may be a public interest component in assessing whether an 
actual or perceived impairment has occurred. For example, in Re 
Cromer, the Court stated that had Mrs. Cramer's comments been 
directed to the topic of the meeting, allowing her to speak would 
have been in the public interest. However, the extent to which con-
siderations of public interest are relevant in determining whether 
there has been an actual or perceived impairment remains to be de-
termined by the courts and administrative boards. 
SIGNIFICANT IMPLICATIONS FOR EDUCATORS 
Canadian case law, statutes and codes of ethics would indicate that 
the extent of freedom of speech which teachers enjoy will be con-
strained by the fact that they are teachers. The values of the educa-
tion system, as defined by the curriculum, statute, and code of 
ethics, effectively constrain speech and conduct which is detrimen-
tal to the reputation and public confidence, and to the effective and 
efficient functioning of the education system. 
Although the extent to which Canadian teachers enjoy aca-
demic freedom has not been explored in the courts, Keegstra indi-
cates that its importance may be recognized by school boards and 
that it may, to a limited extent, exist within the classroom. 
However, the extent of this freedom will probably be influenced by 
the characteristics of the students (including their age and sophisti-
cation), the content of the message, and its consistency with pre-
scribed messages. 
For conduct falling outside school boundaries, Cromer effec-
tively demonstrates that the public perception of a person as a 
85 Supra note 84 at 43. 
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teacher, and thus their identification with the school, will have a 
grave impact on freedom of expression outside the classroom. Thus 
teachers have the onus of acting with caution outside school-being 
ever aware of the public perception of them as teachers. 
The effect of Fraser is to impose a relatively low threshold for 
expression to be prohibited. As evidenced by Attis (Bd of Inquiry) 
there need only be doubt cast on the actual or perceived ability of 
the teachers to perform their duties, to act impartially and fairly, or 
their ability to function as role models. No actual impairment 
needs to be shown, and nor is direct evidence required to show that 
such an impairment has occurred. This decision, however was sub-
sequently overturned by the Court of Appeal, so it is now necessary 
to prove by direct evidence that actual impairment has occurred. 
Whether this case will be followed remains to be seen, as it consti-
tutes a significant reading down of the decision by the Supreme 
Court of Canada in Fraser. 
While the American approach is useful as a basis for compari-
son, Canada and the US are two distinct countries with different 
cultures and identities. Canadians typically like the perception of 
being "multicultural" and "tolerant": two concepts that perhaps un-
dermine the credibility of each other. Nonetheless, freedom of ex-
pression must be considered within this context, and also in con-
nection with the other values underlying the Charter. 
In an educational context, the "medium" through which the 
"message" is delivered is the teacher. The school board has a very 
real interest in exercising some degree of control over teachers' 
freedom of speech to the extent that it conflicts with the school 
agenda. As a "medium," the teacher owes a duty to the community 
and school; an appropriate standard of behavior is needed inside 
and outside the classroom. In writing about teacher misconduct, 
Manley-Casimir and Piddocke comment on the powerful role of 
the teacher as medium: 
The primary purpose of the public school teacher is to 
teach students. This teaching is usually admitted to in -
elude moral training as well as intellectual, factual and 
physical training. Such training, both moral and intellec-
tual, depends on the teacher's being an example (though 
not necessarily a perfect example) of the values which the 
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teacher has undertaken to inculcate and develop in the 
pupils. 86 
Thus a teacher must ensure their speech is not inconsistent with 
their role as "medium" nor with the achievement of the purpose 
which they undertake, as defined in subsection 54(e) of the 
Education Act. 
IMPLICATIONS AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS 
The danger of unduly restricting a teacher's freedom of expression 
is to suppress alternative or minority viewpoints which may be 
equally as legitimate as the viewpoints of the status quo. Equally 
important is a recognition that everyone has a vested interest in the 
prescribed curriculum to ensure that the values which are essential 
to the functioning of a diverse society like Canada are not under-
mined. To allow unfettered freedom of expression would permit 
situations similar to those in Keegstra and Ross to go unchecked. 
Alternative ways of bringing diversity into the classroom must 
be explored. Ultimately, officials should decide what should be in-
cluded in the curriculum, however, a more inclusive approach to ar-
riving at a prescribed curriculum may be beneficial. A broader cur-
riculum which recognizes the diversity and reality of a multicultural 
society would by its very nature redefine the extent of a teacher's 
freedom of expression. This approach would make fewer topics 
"taboo" and encourage the pursuit of educational goals (such as 
truth) by encouraging and presenting a variety of viewpoints. This 
ultimately would have the effect of reducing the tension between 
the prescribed curriculum and alternative viewpoints expressed in-
side and outside the classroom. 
86 Supra note 34 at 139. 
